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Abstract. With the availability of user-generated content in the Web,
malicious users dispose of huge repositories of private (and often sensi-
tive) information regarding a large part of the world’s population. The
self-disclosure of personal information, in the form of text, pictures and
videos, exposes the authors of such contents (and not only them) to many
criminal acts such as identity thefts, stalking, burglary, frauds, and so
on. In this paper, we propose a way to evaluate the harmfulness of any
form of content by defining a new data mining task called content sensi-
tivity analysis. According to our definition, a score can be assigned to any
object (text, picture, video...) according to its degree of sensitivity. Even
though the task is similar to sentiment analysis, we show that it has its
own peculiarities and may lead to a new branch of research. Thanks to
some preliminary experiments, we show that content sensitivity analysis
can not be addressed as a simple binary classification task.
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1 Introduction
Internet privacy has gained much attention in the last decade due to the suc-
cess of online social networks and other social media services that expose our
lives to the wide public. In addition to personal and behavioral data collected
more or less legitimately by companies and organizations, many websites and
mobile/web applications store and publish tons of user-generated content in the
form of text posts and comments, pictures and videos which, very often, capture
and represent private moments of our life. The availability of user-generated con-
tent is a huge source of relatively easy-to-access private (and often very sensitive)
information concerning habits, preferences, families and friends, hobbies, health
and philosophy of life, which expose the authors of such contents (or any other
individual referenced by them) to many (cyber)criminal risks, including iden-
tity theft, stalking, burglary, frauds, cyberbullying or “simply” discrimination
in workplace or in life in general. Sometimes users are not aware of the dan-
gers due to the uncontrolled diffusion of their sensitive information and would
probably avoid publishing it if only someone told them how harmful it could be.
In this paper, we address exactly this problem by proposing a way to measure
the degree of sensitivity of any type of user-generated content. To this purpose,
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we define a new data mining task that we call content sensitivity analysis (CSA),
inspired by sentiment analysis [13]. The goal of CSA is to assign a score to any
object (text, picture, video...) according to the amount of sensitive information it
potentially discloses. The problem of private content analysis has already been
investigated as a way to characterize anonymous vs. non anonymous content
posting in specific social media [5,15,16] or question-and-answer platforms [14].
However, the link between anonymity and sensitive contents is not that obvious:
users may post anonymously because, for instance, they are referring to illegal
matters (e.g., software/steaming piracy, black market and so on); conversely,
fully identifiable persons may post very sensitive contents simply because they
are underestimating the visibility of their action [18,19]. Although CSA has
some points in common with anonymous content analysis and the well-known
sentiment analysis task, we show that it has its own peculiarities and may lead
to a brand new branch of research, opening many intriguing challenges in several
computer science and linguistics fields.
Through some preliminary but extensive experiments on a large annotated
corpus of social media posts, we show that content sensitivity analysis can not
be addressed straightforwardly. In particular, we design a simplified CSA task
leveraging binary classification to distinguish between sensitive and non sensitive
posts by testing several bag-of-words and word embedding models. According to
our experiments, the classification performances achieved by the most accurate
models are far from being satisfactory. This suggests that content sensitivity
analysis should consider more complex linguistic and semantic aspects, as well
as more sophisticated machine learning models.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: we report a short analysis
of the related scientific literature in Sect. 2 and Sect. 3 provides the definition of
content sensitivity analysis and presents some challenging aspects of this new
task together with some hints for possible solutions; the preliminary experiments
are reported and discussed in Sect. 4; finally, Sect. 5 concludes by also presenting
some open problems and suggestions for future research.
2 Related Work
With the success of online social networks and content sharing platforms, under-
standing and measuring the exposure of user privacy in the Web has become
crucial [11,12]. Thus, many different metrics and methods have been proposed
with the goal of assessing the risk of privacy leakage in posting activities [1,23].
Most research efforts, however, focus on measuring the overall exposure of users
according to their privacy settings [8,19] or position within the network [18].
Very few research works address the problem of measuring the amount of
sensitivity of user-generated content, and yet different definitions of sensitivity
are adopted. In [5], for instance, the authors define sensitivity of a social media
post as the extent to which users think the post should be anonymous. Then,
they try to understand the nature of content posted anonymously and analyze
the differences between content posted on anonymous (e.g., Whisper) and non-
anonymous (e.g., Twitter) social media sites. They also find significant linguistic
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differences between anonymous and non-anonymous content. A similar approach
has been applied on posts collected from a famous question-and-answer website
[14]. The authors of this work identify categories of questions for which users are
more likely to exercise anonymity and analyze different machine learning model
to predict whether a particular answer will be written anonymously. They also
show that post sensitivity should be viewed as a nuanced measure rather than as
a binary concept. In [2], the authors propose a ranking-based method for assess-
ing the privacy risk emerging from textual contents related to sensitive topics,
such as depression. They use latent topic models to capture the background
knowledge of an hypothetical rational adversary who aims at targeting the most
exposed users. Additionally, the results are exploited to inform and alert users
about their risk of being targeting.
Similarly to sentiment analysis [13], valuable linguistic resources are needed
to identify sensitive content in texts. To the best of our knowledge, the only
works addressing this issue are [6,22], where the authors leverage prototype the-
ory and traditional theoretical approaches to describe and evaluate a dictionary
of privacy designed for content analysis. Dictionary categories are evaluated
according to privacy-related categories from an existing content analysis tool,
using a variety of text corpora.
The problem of sensitive content detection has been investigated as a pattern
recognition problem in images as well. In [25], the authors leverage massive
social images and their privacy settings to learn the object-privacy correlation
and identify categories of privacy-sensitive object automatically. To increase the
accuracy and speed of the classifier, they propose a deep multi-task learning
architecture that learn more representative deep convolutional neural networks
and more discriminative tree classifier. Additionally, they use the outcomes of
such model to identify the most suitable privacy settings and/or blur sensitive
objects automatically. This framework is further improved in [24], where the
authors add a clustering-based approach to also incorporate trustworthiness of
users being granted to see the images in the prediction model.
Contrary to the above-mentioned works, in this paper we formally define
the general task of content sensitivity analysis independently from the type of
data to be analyzed. Additionally, we provide some suggestions for improving
the accuracy of the results and show experimentally that the task is challenging,
and deserves further investigation and greater research efforts.
3 Content Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, we introduce the new data mining task that we call content
sensitivity analysis (CSA), aimed at determining the amount of privacy-sensitive
content expressed in any user-generated content. We first distinguish two cases,
namely basic CSA and continuous CSA, according to the outcome of the analysis
(binary or continuous). Then, we identify a set of subtasks and discuss their
theoretical and technical details. Before introducing the technical details of CSA,
we briefly provide the intuition behind CSA by describing a motivating example.
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3.1 Motivating Example
To explain the main objectives of CSA and the scientific challenges associated to
them, we consider the example in Fig. 1. To decide whether (and to what extent)
the sentence is sensitive, an inference algorithm should be able to answer the
following questions:
1. Subjects: whose information is going to be disclosed?
2. Information types: does the post refer to any potentially sensitive infor-
mation type?
3. Terms: does the post mention any sensitive term?
4. Topics: does the post mention any sensitive topic?
5. Relations: is sensitive information referred to any of the subjects?
Fig. 1. An example of a potentially privacy-sensitive post.
By observing the post in Fig. 1, it is clear that: the post discloses information
about the author and his friend Alice Green (1); the post contains spatiotempo-
ral references (“now” and “General Hospital”), which are generally considered
intrinsically sensitive; the post mentions “chemo”, a potentially sensitive term
(3); the sentence is related to “cancer”, a potentially sensitive topic (4); the
sentence structure suggests that the two subjects of disclosure have cancer and
they are both about to start their first course of chemotherapy (5).
It is clear that, reducing sensitivity to anonymity, as done in previous research
work [5,14], is only one side of the coin. Instead, CSA has much more in common
with the famous sentiment analysis (SA) task, where the objective is to measure
the “polarity” or “sentiment” of a given text [7,13]. However, while SA has
already a well-established theory and may count on a set of easy-to-access and
easy-to-use tools, CSA has never been defined before. Therefore, apart from the
known open problems in SA (such as sarcasm detection), CSA involves three
new scientific challenges:
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1. Definition of sensitivity. A clear definition of sensitivity is required. Sen-
sitivity is often defined in the legal systems, such as in the EU General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR), as a characteristic of some personal data
(e.g., criminal or medical records), but a cognitive and perceptive explana-
tion of what can be defined as “sensitive” is still missing [22].
2. Sensitivity-annotated corpora. Large text corpora need to be annotated
according to sensitivity and at multiple levels: at the sentence level (“I got
cancer” is more sensitive than “I got some nice volleyball shorts”), at the
topic level (“health” is more sensitive than “sports”) and at the term level
(“cancer” is more sensitive than “shorts”).
3. Context-aware sensitivity. Due to its subjectivity, a clear evaluation of
the context is needed. The fact that a medical doctor talks about cancer is
not sensitive per se, but if she talks about some of her patients having cancer,
she could disclose very sensitive information.
In the following, we will provide the formal definitions concerning CSA and
provide some preliminary ideas on how to address the problem.
3.2 Definitions
Here, we provide the details regarding the formal framework of content sensitivity
analysis. To this purpose, we consider generic user-generated contents, without
specifying their nature (whether textual, visual or audiovisual). We will propose
a definition of “sensitivity” further in this section. The simplest way to define
CSA is as follows:
Definition 1 (basic content sensitivity analysis). Given a user-generated
object oi ∈ O, with O being the domain of all user-generated contents, the
basic content sensitivity analysis task consists in designing a function fs : O →
{sens, na, ns}, such that fs(oi) = sens iff oi is privacy-sensitive, fs(oi) = ns iff
oi is not sensitive, otherwise fs(oi) = na.
The na value is required since the assignment of a correct sensitivity value
could be problematic when dealing with controversial contents or borderline
topics. In some cases, assessing the sensitivity of a content object is simply
impossible without some additional knowledge, i.e., the conversation a post is
part of, the identity of the author of a post, and so on. In addition, sensitivity is
not the same for all sensitive objects: a post dealing with health is certainly more
sensitive than a post dealing with vacations, although both can be considered
as sensitive. This suggests that, instead of considering sensitivity as a binary
feature of a text, a more appropriate definition of CSA should take into account
different degrees of sensitivity, as follows:
Definition 2 (continuous content sensitivity analysis). Let oi ∈ O be a
user-generated object, with O being the domain of all user-generated contents.
The continuous content sensitivity analysis task consists in designing a function
fs : O → [−1, 1], such that fs(oi) = 1 iff oi is maximally privacy-sensitive,
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fs(oi) = −1 iff oi is minimally privacy-sensitive, fs(oi) = 0 iff oi has unknown
sensitivity. The value σi = fs(oi) is the sensitivity score of object oi.
According to this definition, sensitive objects have 0 < σ ≤ 1, while non sen-
sitive posts have −1 ≤ σ < 0. In general, when σ ≈ 0 the sensitivity of an object
cannot be assessed confidently. Of course, by setting appropriate thresholds, a
continuous CSA can be easily turned into a basic CSA task.
At this point, a congruent definition of “sensitivity” is required to set up the
task correctly. Although different characterizations of privacy-sensitivity exist,
there is no consistent and uniform theory [22]; so, in this work, we consider a more
generic, flexible and application-driven definition of privacy-sensitive content.
Definition 3 (privacy-sensitive content). A generic user-generated content
object is privacy-sensitive if it makes the majority of users feel uncomfortable
in writing or reading it because it may reveal some aspects of their own or others’
private life to unintended people.
Notice that “uncomfortableness” should not be guided by some moral or eth-
ical judgement about the disclosed fact, but uniquely by its harmfulness towards
privacy. Such a definition allows the adoption of the “wisdom of the crowd” prin-
ciple in contexts where providing an objective definition of what is sensitive (and
what is not sensitive) is particularly hard. Moreover, it has also an intuitive jus-
tification. Different social media may have different meaning of sensitivity. For
instance, in a professional social networking site, revealing details about one’s
own job is not only tolerated, but also encouraged, while one may want to hide
detailed information about her professional life in a generic photo-video sharing
platform. Similarly, in a closed message board (or group), one may decide to
disclose more private information than in open ones. Sensitivity towards certain
topics also varies from country to country. As a consequence, function fs can be
learnt according to an annotated corpus of content objects as follows.
Definition 4 (sensitivity function learning). Let O = {(oi, σi)}Ni=1 be a set
of N annotated objects oi ∈ O with the related sensitivity score σi ∈ [−1, 1].
The goal of a sensitivity function learning algorithm is to search for a function
fs : O → [−1, 1], such that
∑N
i=1 (fs(oi) − σi)2 is minimum.
The simplest way to address this problem is by setting a regression (or clas-
sification, in the case of basic CSA) task. However, we will show in Sect. 4 that
such an approach is unable to capture the actual manifold of sensitivity accu-
rately. Hence, in the following sections, we present a fine-grained definition of
CSA together with a list of open subproblems related to CSA and provide some
hints on how to address them.
3.3 Fine-Grained Content Sensitivity Analysis
In the previous section, we have considered contents as monolithic objects with
a sensitivity score associated to them. However, in general, any user-generated
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content object (text, video, picture) may contain both privacy-sensitive and
privacy-unsensitive elements. For instance, a long text post (or video) may deal
with some unsensitive topic but the author may insert some references to her or
his private life. Similarly, a user may post a picture of her own desk deemed to
be anonymous but some elements may disclose very private information (e.g.,
the presence of train tickets, drug paraphernalia, someone else’s photo and so
on). Moreover, the same object (or some of its elements) may violate the privacy
of multiple subjects, including the author and other people mentioned in the
corpus, in a different way. For all these reasons, here we propose a fine-grained
definition of content sensitivity analysis. The definition is as follows:
Definition 5 (fine-grained content sensitivity analysis). Let oi ∈ O be a
user-generated content object. Let Ei = {eij}mij=1 ⊂ E be a set of mi ≥ 1 elements
(or components) that constitutes the object oi, with E being the domain of all
possible elements. Let Pi = {pik}nij=1 ⊂ P be the set of ni ≥ 1 persons (or subjects)
mentioned in oi, with P being the domain of all subjects. The fine-grained content
sensitivity analysis task consists in designing a function fs : E × P → [−1, 1],
such that fs(eij , p
i
k) = 1 iff e
i





k) = −1 iff eii is minimally privacy-sensitive for subject pik, fs(eij , pik) = 0
iff eij has unknown sensitivity for subject p
i







sensitivity score of element eij towards subject p
i
k.
Notice that |Ei| ≥ 1 since each object contains at least one element (when
|Ei| = 1, the only element ei1 corresponds the object oi itself). Similarly |Pi| ≥ 1
because each object has at least the author as subject. In the example reported
in Fig. 1, the post contains only one element (there is only one sentence) and
concerns two subjects (the author and Alice Green). According to Definition 5
(and to what we said in Sect. 3.1), the sensitivity score of the post towards both
the author and Alice Green will be high.
3.4 Challenges and Possible Solutions
Fine-grained content sensitivity analysis presents many scientific and technical
challenges, and may benefit of the cross-fertilization of computational linguistics,
machine learning and semantic analysis. Addressing the problem of connecting
sensitivity to specific subjects in texts requires the solution of many NLP tasks
such as named entity recognition, relation extraction [21], and coreference res-
olution [4]. Additionally, concept extraction and topic modeling are important
to understand whether a given text deals with sensitive content. To this pur-
pose, privacy dictionaries [22] could provide a valid support for tagging certain
topics/terms as sensitive or non-sensitive. Sentiment analysis and emotion detec-
tion could also reveal private personality traits if related to contents associated
to certain topics, persons or categories of persons. Furthermore, elements in a
sentence cannot be simply considered as separated entities, but the connection
between different parts of a text play an important role in determining the cor-
rect fine-grained sensitivity. It is clear that such a complex problem requires the
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availability of massive annotated text corpora and the design of robust machine
learning algorithms to cope with the sparsity of the feature space. All these con-
siderations apply to the case of visual and audiovisual content as well, but, in
addition, the intrinsic difficulty of handling multimedia data makes the above
mentioned challenge even harder and more computationally expensive.
In the next section, we will show how the basic content sensitivity analysis
settings can be modeled as a binary classification problem on text data using
different approaches with scarce or moderate success, thus showing the necessity
of a more systematic and in-depth investigation of the problem.
4 Preliminary Experiments
In this section, we report the results of some preliminary experiments aimed at
showing the feasibility of content sensitivity analysis together with its difficulties.
The experiments are conducted under the basic CSA framework (see Definition 1
in Sect. 3) with the only difference that we do not consider the “na” class. We
set up a binary classification task to distinguish whether a given input text is
privacy-sensitive or not. Before presenting the results, in the following, we first
introduce the data, then we provide the details of our experimental protocol.
4.1 Annotated Corpus
Since all previous attempts of identifying sensitive text have leveraged user
anonymity as a discriminant for sensitive content [5,14], there is no reliable
annotated corpus that we can use as benchmark. Hence, we construct our own
dataset by leveraging a crowdsourcing experiment. We use one of the datasets
described in [3], consisting of 9917 anonymized social media posts, mostly writ-
ten in English, with a minimum length of 2 characters and a maximum length
of 435 (the average length is 80). Thus, they well represent typical social media
short posts. On the other hand, they are not annotated for the specific purpose
of our experiment and, because of their shortness, they are also very difficult to
analyze. Consequently, after discarding all useless posts (mostly uncomprehen-
sible ones) we have set up a crowdsourcing experiment by using a Telegram bot
that, for each post, asks whether it is sensitive or not. As third option, it was
also possible to select “unable to decide”. We collected the annotations of 829
posts from 14 distinct annotators. For each annotated post, we retain the most
frequently chosen annotation. Overall, 449 posts where tagged as non sensitive,
230 as sensitive, 150 as undecidable. Thus, the final dataset consists of 679 posts
of the first two categories (we discarded all 150 undecidable posts).
4.2 Datasets
We consider two distinct document representations for the dataset, a bag-of-
words and four word vector models. To obtain the bag-of-word representation we
perform the following steps. First, we remove all punctuation characters of terms
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contained in the input posts as well as short terms (less than two characters) and
terms containing digits. Then, we build the bag-of-words model with all remain-
ing 2584 terms weighted by their tfidf score. Differently from classic text mining
approaches, we deliberately exclude lemmatization, stemming and stop word
removal from text preprocessing, since those common steps would affect content
sensitivity analysis negatively. Indeed, inflections (removed by lemmatization
and stemming) and stop words (like “me”, “myself”) are important to decide
whether a sentence reproduces some personal thoughts or private action/status.
Hereinafter, the bag-of-words representation is referred to as BW2584.
The word vector representation, instead, is built using word vectors pre-
trained with two billion tweets (corresponding to 42 billion tokens) using the
GloVe (Global Vector) model [17]. We use this word embedding method as it
consistently outperforms both continuous bag-of-words and skip-gram model
architectures of word2vec [10]. In detail, we use three representation, here called
WV25, WV50 and WV100 with, respectively, 25, 50 and 100 dimensions1. Addi-
tionally, we build an ensemble by considering the concatenation of the three
vector spaces. The latter representation is named WVEns.
Finally, from all five datasets we removed all posts having an empty bag-
of-words or word vector representation. Such preprocessing step further reduces
the size of the dataset down to 611 posts (221 sensitive and 390 non sensitive),
but allows for a fair performance comparison.
4.3 Experimental Settings
Each dataset obtained as described beforehand is given in input to a set of six
classifiers. In details, we use k-NN, decision tree (DT), Multi-layer Perceptron
(MLP), SVM, Random Forest (RF), and Gradient Boosted trees (GBT). We do
not execute any systematic parameter selection procedure since our main goal is
not to compare the performances of classifiers, but, rather, to show the overall
level of accuracy that can be achieved in a basic content sensitivity analysis task.
Hence, we use the following default parameter for each classifier:
– kNN: we set k = 3 in all experiments;
– DT: for all datasets, we use C4.5 with Gini Index as split criterion, allowing a
minimum of two records per node and minimum description length as pruning
strategy;
– MLP: we train a shallow neural network with one hidden layer; the number
of neurons of the hidden layer is 30 for the bag-of-words representation and
20 for all word vector representations;
– SVM: for all datasets, we use the polynomial kernel with default parameters;
– RF: we train 100 models with Gini index as splitting criterion in all experi-
ments;
– GBT: for all datasets, we use 100 models with 0.1 as learning rate and 4 as
maximum tree depth.
1 Pre-trained vectors are available at https://nlp.stanford.edu/projects/glove/.
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All experiments are conducted by performing ten-fold cross-validation, using,
for each iteration, nine folds as training set and the remaining fold as test set.
4.4 Results and Discussion
The summary of the results, in terms of average F1-score, are reported in Table 1.
It is worth noting that the scores are, in general, very low (between 0.5826,
obtained by the neural network on the bag-of-words model, and 0.6858, obtained
by Random Forest on the word vector representation with 50 dimensions). Of
course, these results are biased by the fact that data are moderately unbalanced
(64% of posts fall in the non-sensible class). However they are not completely
negative, meaning that there is space for improvement. We observe that the win-
ning model-classifier pair (50-dimensional word vector processed with Random
Forest) exhibits high recall on the non-sensitive class (0.928) and rather similar
results in terms of precision for the two classes (0.671 and 0.688 for the sensitive
and non-sensitive classes respectively). The real negative result is the low recall
on the sensitive class (only 0.258), due to the high number of false negatives2. We
recall that the number of annotated sensitive posts is only 221, i.e., the number
of examples is not sufficiently large for training a prediction model accurately.
Table 1. Classification in terms of average F1-score for different post representations.
Dataset Type kNN DT MLP SVM RF GBT
BW2584 bag-of-words 0.6579 0.6743 0.5826 0.6481 0.6776 0.6678
WV25 word vector 0.6203 0.6317 0.6497 0.6383 0.6628 0.6268
WV50 word vector 0.6121 0.6105 0.6530 0.6448 0.6858 0.6399
WV100 word vector 0.6367 0.6088 0.6497 0.6563 0.6694 0.6497
WVEns word vector 0.6432 0.5859 0.6481 0.6547 0.6628 0.6416
These results highlight the following issues and perspectives. First, nega-
tive (or not-so-positive) results are certainly due to the lack of annotated data
(especially for the sensitive class). Sparsity is certainly a problem in our set-
tings. Hence, a larger annotated corpus is needed, although this objective is not
trivial. In fact, private posts are often difficult to obtain, because social media
platforms (luckily, somehow) do not allow users to get them using their API.
As a consequence, all previous attempts to guess the sensitivity of text or con-
struct privacy dictionaries strongly leverage user anonymity in public post shar-
ing activities [5,14], or rely on focus groups and surveys [22]. Moreover, without
a sufficiently large corpus, not even the application of otherwise successful deep
learning techniques (e.g., RNNs for sentiment analysis [9]) would produce valid
results. Second, simple classifiers, even when applied to rather complex and rich
representations, can not capture the manifold of privacy sensitivity accurately.
2 Due to space limitations, we do not report detailed precision/recall results.
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So, more complex and heterogenous models should be considered. Probably, an
accurate sensitivity content analysis tool should consider lexical, semantic as
well as grammatical features. Topics are certainly important, but sentence con-
struction and lexical choices are also fundamental. Therefore, reliable solutions
would consist of a combination of computational linguistic techniques, machine
learning algorithms and semantic analysis. Third, the success of picture and
video sharing platforms (such as Instagram and TikTok), implies that any suc-
cessful sensitivity content analysis tool should be able to cope with audiovisual
contents and, in general, with multimodal/multimedia objects (an open problem
in sentiment analysis as well [20]). Finally, provided that a taxonomy of privacy
categories in everyday life exists (e.g., health, location, politics, religious belief,
family, relationships, and so on) a more complex CSA setting might consider,
for a given content object, the privacy sensitivity degree in each category.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have addressed the problem of determining whether a given
content object is privacy-sensitive or not by defining the generic task of content
sensitivity analysis (CSA). Then, we have declined it according to increasing
complexity of the problem settings. Although the task promises to be challeng-
ing, we have shown that it is not unfeasible by presenting a simplified formulation
of CSA based on text categorization. With some preliminary but extensive exper-
iments, we have showed that, no matter the data representation, the accuracy of
such classifiers can not be considered satisfactory. Thus, it is worth investigat-
ing more complex techniques borrowed from machine learning, computational
linguistics and semantic analysis. Moreover, without a strong effort in building
massive and reliable annotated corpora, the performances of any CSA tool would
be barely sufficient, no matter the complexity of the learning model.
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